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Abstract. For highly interdependent yet location-speciﬁc tasks, distributed teams need to closely
coordinate activities and processes. This ﬁeld study in the upstream oil and gas industry focused on
challenges in the coordination of highly interdependent tasks if teams work remotely on an ongoing
basis. Based on 78 semi-structured interviews and observations over a period of 12 months, we
identiﬁed coordination requirements for primary team activities, as well as effects of changing
media capabilities to overcome difﬁculties of ongoing distribution. Implications for media
requirements in the support of ongoing distributed teams are discussed.
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1. Introduction
Work processes in teams require the continuous coordination of resources to
accomplish common goals and react to changing organizational priorities. The
use of computer integrated production management has helped to make
coordination in teams more ﬂexible and to support ever more complex processes.
When computer aided or integrated manufacturing (CAM/CIM) was ﬁrst hailed
as the solution to the challenges awaiting businesses in the Western world in the
1980s/90s, the concept was largely technology driven. However, many of the
seminal studies in CSCW found that the use of technology alters the practices of
coordination and may create problems if the social organization of cooperative
work is disregarded (e. g., Harper et al. 1989; Heath and Luff 1992; Zuboff 1988).
Similarly, researchers in work psychology have pointed out that CIM needs to be
accompanied by an appropriate work organization such as semi-autonomous
teams if the promises of reduced losses and increased ﬂexibility are to be realized
(Kirsch et al. 1994; Pardo et al. 1994). Although the reality did not always live up
to the rhetoric of these management concepts, many ﬁrms successfully changed
how they manage their production.
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With some delay, this change of work practices to more computer integrated
monitoring and concurrent planning has also reached the less stationary
industries such as construction or the exploration and production of hydro-
carbons (Lauche 2008). While some transient industries such as aviation have
been studied extensively (e. g., Fields et al. 2005; Harper et al. 1989), those
traditionally considered ‘low tech’ are still under-researched in CSCW. On
construction sites or drilling rigs simple things like a regular update of current
production ﬁgures on a central server were only worth considering, once remote
sites had reliable and fast access to the central ICT of their companies. Prior to
the advancement of ICT capacity and cheap bandwidth, the planners and
engineers in the headquarter would prepare drawings, work programs, and
schedules up to a certain degree of detail and leave the actual implementation
and troubleshooting to those on the remote site. This Tayloristic division of labor
that assigned ‘thinking’ and ‘doing’ to distinct groups therefore was not only rooted in
historical power differences, but had rather practical reasons, as physical access to the
remote site is by necessity restricted and the exchange of information between remote
partners remains cumbersome. Now that the advancement of ICT and improved
bandwidth have theoretically enabled real-time data transmission to pretty much any
remote site around the globe, planners and on-site mechanics can in fact communicate
in ‘real-time’ and update their process models on a continuous basis with the newest
information.
Assuming that the integration of computerized process monitoring is, in
principle, a similar undertaking in the construction industry or semi-automated
process industries such as oil and gas exploration and production, there should
be lessons learned from the earlier studies of CAM/CIM that would be worth
considering. The work on collective action regulation in teams showed that
teams that were given a higher degree of autonomy in coordinating their
internal resources, carrying out detailed planning and cross-training were not
only more ﬂexible and efﬁcient but also better at knowledge sharing and
cohesion (Weber 1997). The general design principle from this earlier work has
been to delegate responsibility as far as possible to the sharp end (Clegg 2000).
Another important aspect identiﬁed in the manufacturing industry is that of
boundary regulation between semi-autonomous teams: while subteams can
function well based on their internal coordination, some form of boundary
spanning is required between teams whose actions can impact on one another
(Zölch 1999). The higher the interdependency between tasks, the more
important coordination becomes. Artman and Waern (1999) and Petterson et
al. (2004) have described how call takers and dispatchers in emergency
response teams create common ground with callers and response personnel. For
unmanned space exploration, research teams with relative low task interdepen-
dency were found to beneﬁt from simultaneous access to real-time data, as
more people could participate in the collaboration and scientists could adapt
their models based on real-time data (Olson and Olson 2000). However,
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manned space exploration involves more task interdependency in the dynamic
interaction between astronauts and ﬂight controllers. Thus more scripted roles
were required for who should listen in and who may issue requests (Patterson
et al. 1999; Patterson and Woods 2001).
The advance of ICT into traditional ‘low tech’ industries is likely to progress
and become more pronounced as improvements of infrastructure reach
increasingly remoter locations. But the question remains whether better access
is a positive development in all cases and for all involved. The safety-critical
nature of many tasks in these areas makes it crucial that ICT changes do not lead
to additional disruptions of established routines and processes. It is important
therefore to obtain a better understanding of how different technologies may
affect cooperation and coordination in such teams. In the present paper, we report
ﬁndings from a ﬁeld study in the offshore oil industry, in which we investigated
changes in the ongoing coordination in distributed production teams due to the
implementation of new ICT. The main rationale of our study was to investigate
effects of changing technologies on the coordination and cooperation in
distributed production teams in terms of every-day coordination processes.
Unlike most domains covered in the existing research about distributed
working (e. g., management, design, or student teams; Hammond et al. 2005;
Jarvenpaa and Leidner 1999; Kirkman et al. 2004), geographic distribution in oil
and gas exploration and production is not due to strategic business decisions, but
a result of the nature of the task. The work at the ‘sharp end’ is by its very nature
remote and risky, which in turn means that support functions and managerial staff
are preferably not spread out across all rigs but centrally located. Similar forms of
distributed coordination can be found in domains such as construction, military,
emergency response, aviation and space ﬂight. Compared to space ﬂight and
aviation, however, collaboration in the oil and gas industry is less proceduralized
and rather driven by market ﬂuctuation and performance. Oil production is
further characterized by mostly continuous processes, compared to the more
project-based nature of other areas like space exploration, military operations, or
construction. It features complex, dynamic tasks with rich practices of
collaboration in existing subgroups with a legacy of different tools and cultures.
A feature the oil and gas industry shares with space exploration or military is that
many tasks are highly safety-critical and require specialist training for survival in
an unwelcoming and potentially harmful environment.
2. Methods
2.1. Organizational context
Our study was conducted at one branch of a globally operating oil and gas
exploration company. During the course of the study this company implemented
new communication and information technologies, namely video-conferencing,
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desktop-sharing, and real-time access to plant and process data, in addition to
existing media (mainly phone, email, and audio-conferencing). The rationale for
the implementation was to improve cooperation between the ofﬁce and the rig
side, i. e., onshore and offshore personnel.
2.2. Participants and procedure
We conducted 78 semi-structured interviews with personnel from various functions
onshore and offshore (see Table 1 for an overview). Questions covered the type and
frequency of onshore–offshore contacts, communication partners and rationales, the
technology used for these contacts, as well as individual tasks and responsibilities
within the teams. During the interviews we also asked speciﬁcally for experiences
with the new ICTand how implementation had changed team processes and relations
between the two subgroups. The interviews lasted between 30 and 90 min (avg.
about 60 min). All interviews were recorded on tape and transcribed verbatim prior
to analysis. The ﬁrst author was located on site in the ofﬁce and over the course of
12 months regularly conducted workplace observations of onshore meetings and
normal work situations, as well as episodes of critical incidents. In addition,
observations offshore were conducted by the ﬁrst author during 2–5 day visits to two
offshore installations. Information on media use, frequencies, and rationales for
media choices were based on self-reports in the interviews as well as observations.
2.3. Data analysis
Interviews were content analyzed using thematic coding in Atlas-ti. The main
focus of the analysis lay on descriptions of how subgroups coordinated individual
tasks and the role diverse media played in their support. In a ﬁrst step we
identiﬁed speciﬁc onshore and offshore roles, tasks, and functions as well as
coordination requirements between the two subgroups. Based on these descrip-
tions we identiﬁed primary activities in which coordination between onshore and
Table 1. Type and number of onshore and offshore personnel interviewed.
Onshore functions # Offshore functions #
TEAM MEMBERS
Support engineers 39 Technicians 7
Petroleum engineers 3
MANAGERS
Team leaders 6 Team leaders 5
Technical authorities 4 Operations engineers 6
Field operations managers 3 Installation managers 5
Total onshore 52 Total offshore 26
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offshore personnel was needed. We did not have a-priori assumptions on how
media use would change coordination; instead we aimed to ﬁnd new ‘emerging’
patterns (Glaser 1992). We therefore started with an open coding technique
(Walsham 1995), using high-level codes to categorize statements with respect to
the primary activities. For each primary activity we then coded the type of
medium used, usage patterns such as frequencies or preferences, and comments
on the positive or negative aspects of a medium for this task (e. g., ability to
document requests in emails versus inability to check for comprehension). We
also speciﬁcally marked examples and episodes that illustrated positive or
negative aspects of media, as well as statements that illustrated modiﬁcations in
the coordination between subgroups due to the changes in technology. As we
were interested in the impact of technology changes in a distributed setting, we
used our initial codings to contrast statements and experiences from onshore and
offshore participants. The longitudinal nature of the study further allowed us to
sketch changes in coordination over time comparing statements of participants
before, shortly after, and several months after the implementation. We used the
team observations to obtain a ﬁrst hand impression of team coordination and
media use, but also to validate interview statements by our participants.
3. Results
3.1. Subgroup roles and primary team activities
“The fact that we’re hundreds of miles apart [...] if you don’t coordinate
you’re going to fall off the face of the earth.” [onshore team leader]
As this ﬁrst quote demonstrates, close coordination between subgroups was
perceived as an indispensable part of every-day work processes in production
teams. Onshore and offshore personnel typically described their overall team task
as “to keep the plant running, exporting gas at a maximum rate”. Our participants
made it very clear, however, that the degree of involvement and the dependence
of ofﬁce and rig were not uniform over the production process. In stark
simpliﬁcation, most participants considered planning the task of onshore staff,
which then “hands over to offshore for execution”. This division was accepted
and expected by both sides, as the following comment by an offshore technician
shows:
“In an ideal world the guys offshore would love to be given a bag with all
their tools, all their equipment, all their spares, and be taken aside and said,
‘Right, there you go, that is yours; for the next two days, don’t come back
and see us ever again until it is ﬁnished’.”
Onshore engineers saw their main tasks in the translation of business or strategic
decisions into manageable work packages for offshore, the prioritization of work
packages, the control of work with respect to technical and legal standards, vendor
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management, and engineering support in case of operational problems. Offshore
personnel, in contrast, saw their role optimally as “purely execution” including the
monitoring and control of production equipment, and the maintenance of equipment
and plant. As a rough generalization, most tasks offshore could be characterized as
primarily mechanical/technical (at least at the lower levels of the offshore
organization), whereas tasks onshore were consistently of an intellectual/analytic
nature (Driskell et al. 1987). As we will show later, this clear role differentiation
became somewhat blurred by the implementation of additional ICT capabilities.
The divide in roles and responsibilities was also reﬂected in the demographics
and work patterns of the two groups. Onshore personnel were characterized by a
much higher number of university educated engineers and a larger number of
younger and female staff, compared to offshore personnel. Onshore personnel
further kept normal ofﬁce hours (eight hours, Monday to Friday), while offshore
staff operated on twelve hour day and night shifts for seven days a week. The
physical working conditions for onshore and offshore workers are shown in
Figure 1, which presents typical environments in the ofﬁce onshore and on the rig
offshore.
Figure 1. Typical work environments onshore and offshore. Top two pictures: team areas in
the onshore ofﬁce; bottom left: view of the main console in a central control room offshore;
bottom right: part of the production area on an oil platform.
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In total, we found three major areas in which coordination between onshore
and offshore was required on a regular basis:
1. well and plant conﬁguration for optimized production,
2. planned and unplanned maintenance of the offshore installation, and
3. upset response, i. e., reactions to unexpected events.
Across all three areas, we identiﬁed nine primary activities members had to
engage in on an ongoing basis to accomplish the team task. These were planning,
executing, monitoring, reporting/informing, trouble-shooting, negotiating, coor-
dination across team boundaries, documenting, and networking/maintenance of
social relationships. Not all of these tasks were of equal criticality, however. Only
the ﬁrst ﬁve of the these activities, namely planning, executing, monitoring,
reporting/informing, and trouble-shooting, can be considered as critical, in the sense
that without them the overall team task could not be achieved. Many of the tasks
were of a cyclic nature in that they reappeared again and again in a similar way, often
guided by written procedures and detailed guidelines. Reporting/informing, for
instance, was generally done in routinely scheduled meetings between the onshore
and offshore subgroups throughout the week on a ﬁxed agenda of topics (e. g.,
morning reports, maintenance planning, production optimization, health and safety).
Activities also differed in the degree of ‘scriptedness’ or reliance on existing rules
and regulations. Planning, for example, followed a stringent procedure, which
determined who was to be involved at what stage and for which clearance had to be
achieved before a task could pass through consecutive planning gates. Similarly,
execution of tasks offshore relied on a detailed planning and reporting system for
every single activity to guarantee that jobs could be executed on time and to prevent
overlaps between several hazardous jobs at the same location. Activities like
executing and monitoring in contrast to trouble-shooting also demonstrate that
activities differed in their duration or cyclical nature. Monitoring required continuous
24/7 attention, whereas trouble-shooting activities only became relevant if critical
events occurred. Monitoring can thus be considered an ongoing task, trouble-
shooting a sporadic activity. Reporting/informing and planning lay somewhere in
between, as they occurred on regular basis, but were not required in the same
ongoing manner as monitoring activities.
Due to the distribution of responsibilities between ofﬁce (planning and support)
and rig (execution and maintenance) and the different physical access to plant and
equipment, the responsibilities for primary tasks and the degree of involvement of
onshore and offshore personnel varied considerably. Tasks such as planning and
coordination across team boundaries were clearly driven and guided by onshore,
while others such as execution and monitoring were by necessity located offshore.
Table 2 provides a summary of the nine activities with respect to responsible group,
task criticality, its cyclic nature (ongoing, cyclic, sporadic), and degree of
scriptedness (high vs. little or no reliance on standardized procedures).
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3.2. Communication and information exchange: Media availability and use
Teams had access to two sets of technologies to support the cooperation between
remote subgroups on a daily basis: communication technologies and tools for
data exchange. In the ‘traditional’ setting, i. e., before the implementation of
additional ICT, communication technologies consisted of phone, fax, mail, email,
and audio-conferencing. A common way to exchange data between onshore and
offshore was the attachment of spreadsheets, drawings, photos, or presentation
slides to emails. Planning software was available for the planning and scheduling
of tasks, in which the order of jobs, their interdependence, and logistic
requirements such as personnel, tools, materials, or men hours were speciﬁed.
This planning software was accessible only to a restricted number of people
involved in the planning of jobs, i. e., planners and schedulers onshore, as well as
managers offshore. For the access to information on plant and equipment status as
well as production numbers onshore engineers could log into data bases, which
provided a regularly updated overview of the most important offshore systems.
The degree of detail differed, however, compared to information available
offshore, which from time to time led to conﬂicts between subgroups:
“You can actually make two different decisions on the same data. The sample
time is different, because [onshore] it only scans it 10 times a minute. And here
offshore it’s 60 times a minute [...] the average can end up different. [...] A good
example is, we took some data and I made a decision that one of our systems
doesn’t blow down, doesn’t get rid of the gas quick enough. If you look at the
pie data [onshore], we were told, ‘you have to open, keep this valve always
open’. We looked at the data of the [offshore system] and said, ‘no, that’s nuts’.
So you got these two bits of data, and we’re trying to convince the guy onshore,
who’s not got the real-time data, that it’s true.” [offshore installation manager]
This situation changed with the installation of large data screens in the team
areas onshore, which presented continuously updated information on production
Table 2. Characteristics of primary team activities.
Activity Criticality Responsible group Cyclic nature Scriptedness
1. Planning High Primarily onshore Cyclic High
2. Monitoring High Primarily offshore Ongoing Low
3. Execution High Offshore Ongoing High
4. Reporting/informing High Both Cyclic Medium
5. Trouble-shooting High Both Sporadic Low
6. Negotiating Medium Both Sporadic Low
7. Documenting Medium Both Cyclic Medium
8. Coordination across
team boundaries
Medium Primarily onshore Sporadic Low
9. Networking Low Both Both Both
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numbers and well status. This data were driven by the same systems that
displayed information in the offshore control room panels and provided thus a
‘real-time’ picture of processes offshore. (Bandwidth restrictions reduced the
sample rate from some platforms, but the general refresh rate was still higher than
before.) For the better exchange of information, desktop-sharing capabilities were
added to allow simultaneous screen and system manipulations by multiple
members onshore and offshore. The implementation of the new ICT also added
continuous video-conferencing (VC) links and at times cameras for individual use
for communication between subgroups. The video-links connected the onshore
team areas with the central control room offshore and at a later stage also with
ofﬁces and meeting rooms offshore. The cameras were directed so that the picture
showed most of the onshore team area and large parts of the control or meeting
rooms. The organization expected that these new ICT would have “the potential
to signiﬁcantly re-align onshore and offshore teams around the common goal of
the safe and cost efﬁcient extraction of hydrocarbons” and “enable onshore and
offshore staff to work together more effectively using advanced software and
dedicated comms links to platforms, vendors and [company] experts around the
world” (internal documents). Figure 2 shows the video-links between the onshore
ofﬁce and the control room offshore; Figure 3 gives an example for the data
screens in the team areas onshore. Part of the organizational implementation
strategy was the standardization of the onshore ofﬁce environment across all
teams in terms of ICT, as well as physical layout. The arrangements shown in
Figures 2 and 3 were therefore typical for all production teams in this
organization.
According to Clark and Brennan (1991), capabilities of media can be described
with respect to eight characteristics that determine the nature of communication:
copresence (group members occupy the same physical location), visibility (group
members can see one another), audibility (group members can hear one another),
cotemporality (communication is received at the approximate time it is sent),
Figure 2. Use of the video-link in the onshore ofﬁce during a meeting with offshore (left) and
video-screens from the central control room into the ofﬁce (right).
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simultaneity (group members can send and receive messages simultaneously),
sequentiality (group members speaking turns stay in sequence), revisability
(messages can be revised before being sent), and reviewability (messages do not
fade over time). Usually, these aspects are considered in terms of interactions
between human actors. For the purpose of our study we extended this framework
to the exchange and availability of data and information. This differentiation
seemed important to capture the full complexity of the media mix available to
teams and to better understand the effects of the newly implemented ICT. Table 3
gives an overview of traditional and new ICT capabilities based on the eight
dimensions described by Clark and Brennan (1991). As can be seen, the new ICT
added copresence, cotemporality, and visibility for personal interactions,
augmenting phone and email, and replacing audio-conferencing with video-links.
The data screens added visibility, cotemporality, simultaneity, and sequentiality to
processes on the plant. Desktop sharing tools further added cotemporality,
simultaneity, and sequentiality for data exchange.
Direction and frequency of contacts between the two subgroups differed
according to the three major areas for coordination, i. e., well and plant conﬁguration
Figure 3. Screen in the onshore ofﬁce for the display of real-time offshore data.
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for optimized production (primarily from onshore to offshore), planned and
unplanned maintenance of the offshore installation (primarily onshore to offshore),
and upset response (ﬁrst contact from offshore to onshore, further contacts bi-
directional, see detailed discussion of activities below). The main reasons for
onshore contacts with offshore were the need for input in planning and decisions, the
need for additional up-to-date information on the status of the plant or speciﬁc
equipment, requests for actions such as chemical sampling or well tests, and
suggestions for changes in the plant conﬁguration to optimize or re-establish normal
production. Contacts from offshore were driven primarily by requests for help and
technical assistance during unexpected events, as well as routine status reports on
conditions and production in the context of planned meetings.
The self-reported frequencies of contacts between onshore and offshore varied
considerably. Asked how often participants communicated with their colleagues
of the other subgroup, answers ranged from 1 to 300 times per week with an
average of 37.5 times (sd=47.7). At ﬁrst sight the large range in communication
frequencies may surprise. Yet, our sample consisted of multiple functions
(planners, production engineers, offshore installation managers, control room
technicians, etc.), which differed considerably in how closely they needed to
coordinate with the other subgroup. These numbers moreover are self-reports and
must therefore be taken with caution. Our observations, however, substantiated
considerable variation in communication frequencies across functions in a team.
Control room technicians (CRTs), for instance, received a large number of calls
Table 3. Capabilities of traditional and new ICT (dimensions based on Clark and Brennan 1991).
AC audio-conferencing, VC Video-conferencing; features in gray mark additional characteristics of
new ICT, (x) verbal information only, no data
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from onshore, not all of them directly related to their own work. As one CRT
remarked:
“[The central control room] is the telecom exchange as well for all the calls
from the beach. If they don’t know the direct dial number, they come straight
in here, ‘oh, I need to speak to such and such’.”
Onshore planners and some onshore managers, on the other hand, very rarely
contacted offshore, unless unexpected situations occurred:
“It can be a high frequency of interaction with the offshore guys. It just
depends what the issue is. You know, I’ve probably had half a dozen emails
a day in the last two days from the offshore team leader on a particular
issue. So there is a fair bit of communication there. Then it might dry up and
there’ll be nothing for a week or so, and then there might be a lot again.”
[onshore technical authority]
Apart from regular communication in meetings, the amount of contacts
between subgroups seemed thus largely driven by events offshore that required
input or support from the onshore ofﬁce. Prior to the implementation of the new
ICT, the majority of communication between ofﬁce and rig was carried out by
phone or email. Onshore engineers generally seemed to prefer the use of phone
for quick updates on information. One of the reasons given for this preference
was the habit of offshore staff to ignore emails. Offshore seemed to prefer the use
of emails, partly because onshore engineers were often not available at their
desks, but also to document requests from onshore:
“We do use emails all the time because I kind of like to conﬁrm what we
discussed. So if we have a meeting and take some actions, then we ﬁle an email
with the actions, so they are written down, kind of black and white. Similarly, if
we set up like a program to do some tests, again we discuss, and then someone
would send an email with all of the steps to make sure we captured everything
and there isn’t any room for interpretation.” [offshore manager]
For the exchange of information between onshore and offshore before the
implementation of new ICT capabilities, information such as pictures, spread-
sheets, or presentation slides were distributed attached to emails. Both sides had
perceived this as highly inefﬁcient, but the lack of alternatives made this a
common practice. The implementation of VC and desktop-sharing opened new
ways of distributing information. For example, instead of sending photos,
offshore now showed small pieces of faulty equipment directly on the VC.
The use of spreadsheet attachments also decreased due to the easier access
to process and plant data in the onshore ofﬁce, as the new data screens in the
team areas conveniently showed the same information in a continuously
updated way. The screens dramatically improved the accessibility of this type
of information and allowed all team members, independent of their job
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function, to monitor trends and status information. Initially, the new data
screens received somewhat mixed reactions. While some onshore engineers
immediately perceived them as valuable for a better awareness of the present
plant and process status, others such as this maintenance engineer were more
skeptical: “There’s no real-time data that we in the maintenance group would
require”. Asked before the actual implementation, whether they expected the
data screens to be helpful for the coordination with onshore, offshore
technicians and managers expressed the hope that the data screens would
help prevent misunderstandings and support complex discussions:
“Once they’ve got that access and got that knowledge, then yes, I suppose it
is [helpful]. When you can talk to them and say, ‘this is what I’m looking
at’, and you’re looking at it as well; but when you are trying to explain
something that they can’t see, then you’re not really beneﬁting.” [offshore
team leader].
Based on our observations, onshore engineers used the data screens most often
for a quick glance to get a general impression of the plant and production status.
However, the following comment by a control room technicians suggest that the
data screens were not always used to their full potential:
“We still get bizarre requests where somebody [from onshore] will phone up
and say. ‘what’s the pressure, what’s the temperature of components?’ Why
phone the control room? [...] Start looking at the data, which they can get
on the screen.” [control room technician]
VC or phone conversations were frequently accompanied by desktop-sharing
software with the capability to display and manipulate the same data on screens
onshore and offshore. Before, discussions of presentations were either done with
separate paper versions or on independent computers, each side ﬂipping through
the slides at their own pace. Using desktop-sharing, slides were now available in
the ofﬁce and on the rig simultaneously. Not surprisingly, this practice made it
easier for both subgroups to follow the ﬂow of the presentation and reduced the
number of misunderstandings as to what slide, picture, table, etc. the presenter
was referring to.
Over time, the new ICT replaced some of the traditional media and changed
interaction patterns. Most markedly, the video-links replaced a considerable number
of phone calls and nearly all interactions via audio-conferencing. At the beginning,
offshore staff was reluctant to use or allow the use of the continuous video-
conferencing links. The video-connections into the control room were frequently
seen as intrusive and a risk to the independence of their offshore working life-style.
CRTs further perceived it as added pressure from onshore (“I just don’t like it. I mean,
maybe it’s a bit of added pressure if somebody is watching you”). Especially in the
early stages after the implementation of video-links, offshore technicians reacted by
placing coffee cups and hardhats on cameras or by pointing the cameras to ceilings or
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corners. Overall, acceptance of the video-links seemed to be higher onshore than
offshore, yet as this comment shows by no means universal:
“Obviously there’s a feeling of invasion of your privacy. And I know, sitting
there at this end, when the camera is on at the side, you hear the ring; you
know somebody is ringing up. You brace, you watch the camera coming
round on you. It’s a bit spooky. You know, you think, ‘oh my god, I have to
be on my best behavior now, you know, stop picking my nose—’.” [onshore
engineer]
After some months acceptance increased and in most teams video-links were used
almost routinely instead of phones. On several occasions we could even observe
purely social contacts between onshore engineers and technicians or offshore
managers, for instance, when CRTs presented their newest T-shirts to the onshore
ofﬁce, offshore managers placed playful orders for chocolate cookies, or onshore
engineers relayed recent travel experiences abroad. This type of personal relation-
ships had not existed before the implementation of VC. As one onshore engineer
remarked, “some of the guys that I’ve hardly ever spoken to before I’m now chatting
away like we’re best of friends”. On one occasion the combination of VC and net-
meeting was also used to conduct training sessions for offshore staff. Previously
trainers either had to travel offshore or offshore staff had to come into the ofﬁce to
receive the training. Using the VC-connections, offshore staff now also had the
opportunity to directly participate in company town hall meetings.
Not all teams accepted the new ICT with equal fervor and consequence.
Especially, the extent of VC-use varied considerably across teams. The majority of
teams used the VC-links to the control and meeting rooms offshore as a replacement
for phone, email, and audio-conferencing. During the time of our study, two teams
used VC only for formally scheduled meetings due to low acceptance by both
onshore and offshore staff. On several occasions teams discontinued the use of the
VC-links for the duration of a shift, because the new shift “did not like the camera”.
In these teams, offshore technicians still frequently requested that information or
instructions for activities like tests, chemical sampling, or changes to plant
conﬁgurations were sent by email. These emails seemed to act as safeguards against
their supervisors, so that in case of conﬂicts the technicians would be able to
demonstrate that they had acted on the explicit instruction of onshore engineers. The
strong offshore hierarchy here seemed to counteract the opportunity for closer
contacts and integration of processes at the lower levels of the organization.
Standardmail between onshore and offshore was used primarily for documents that
needed signing or company communications such as internal newsletters. This way of
communication was comparatively slow, as all mail had to be sent by helicopter,
which usually happened on shift change days once a week. We do not have any
indications on how frequently standard mail was used, but as neither onshore nor
offshore staff mentioned standard mail when asked for ways of communicating or
exchanging information, we can assume that it was not a prominent medium.
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An overview of the media available in our sample, primary reasons for media
choices based on self-reports and observations, and average usage frequencies as
reported in the interviews can be found in Table 4.
3.3. Coordination requirements and technology effects—illustration for critical
activities
Coordination of processes and tasks between ofﬁce and rig had to be managed on a
continuous basis to achieve the overall team goal: maximum production under safe
conditions. As all interactions were of necessity mediated bymedia, their capabilities
inﬂuenced the ability of teammembers to coordinate. Speciﬁc to our sample was that
teams were able to use a complex mix of ICT, which either complemented (e. g., VC,
desktop-sharing) or competed (e. g., AC, VC, phone) with each other.
In the following sections, we describe our ﬁndings on the use and effects of ICT
with respect to the ﬁve critical team activities, i. e., planning, monitoring, trouble-
shooting, informing/reporting, and executing. These activities were chosen, because
they represent a range of tasks from primarily onshore to primarily offshore
responsibilities, as well as instances of cyclical, ongoing, and sporadic coordination.
3.3.1. Planning
Planning can be considered one of the most critical activities for oil production
teams. Planning encompassed everything from the forecast of production
numbers, the long-term preparation of equipment and plant maintenance to the
logistical steps of getting people and equipment on and off the platform. Because
of the remoteness of offshore platforms and the restricted space to house people
and store equipment, every transfer of personnel and goods had to be planned
minutely down to the number of available seats in a helicopter and the number of
free beds on the rig. The main planning responsibility lay with onshore, and the
process was optimally seen as a one-way process from the ofﬁce to the rig:
“Onshore is really the decision part. It’s like planning the strategy, what are
we going to do, and how are we going to do it. Offshore, theoretically, is
pure execution. It’s just, ‘do what onshore says’.” [offshore engineer]
Onshore engineers were responsible for the planning of individual activities and
the preparation of work packs. The grouping and scheduling of activities was then
done by specialized onshore planners. Planning progressed from a ﬁrst high-level
plan which indicated the main activities in the coming eight quarters to ever more
detailed plans looking ahead for twelve weeks, six weeks, and ﬁnally two weeks.
Each of the activities in these consecutive plans needed to comply with so-called gate
criteria, before it could progress into the next planning stage. Planners had to make
sure, for instance, that materials were ordered and available twelve weeks ahead of
execution. Six weeks before execution the materials needed to be available for
transport to the platform, and twoweeks before execution they needed to be either on
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Table 4. Media use in the sample.
Medium Observed and reported reasons
for use
Reported frequencies
ASYNCHRONOUS MEDIA
Reports Documentation of activities and
status; common ground for
group meetings
≥1/day
Email Follow-up on phone calls or if
not available by phone;
documentation of results; more
complex requests; contact to
unfamiliar people
1–250/week (depending on job
function and situation)
Email attachments
(pictures, slides, etc.)
Preparation for group meetings;
documentation; common ground
for trouble-shooting (e. g., pictures
of failed equipment); exchange
of information such as plans,
data dumps of offshore real-time
data, drawings
Depending on the situation
Planning software Detailing and scheduling of
offshore activities
Continuous for planners
Standard mail Exchange of documents that
needed signing; internal
company communications
[not reported]
SYNCHRONOUS MEDIA
Phone If information is needed fast or
information is of low complexity;
quick updates; short requests
1–100/week (depending on job
function and situation)
Audio-conferencing Group meetings (usually replaced
by VC where available)
Approx. 6/week
Video-conferencing Group meetings; replacement
for phone, mail, and AC
In most teams continuous use
through ‘always-on’ VC-
links;
in few teams only on an
as-needed-basis for meetings
and one-on-one conversations
Desktop-sharing Access to the same information at
the same time in both locations
during meetings for easier reference
(e. g., use of mouse pointers to
details, pacing of slides);
manipulation of information
‘on-line’ for faster decisions
and documentation
Depending on situation
Plant data and trends Monitoring (offshore); basis for
planning decisions (onshore);
early warning of potential
problems offshore (onshore)
Offshore constant; onshore
depending on availability and
job function
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the platform or arriving shortly. Similar gate criteria existed also for all other aspects
of a task, such as ﬁnancial approval, availability of personnel, or special tools. An
activity was only moved to the next planning phase if all requirements were fulﬁlled
at that gate, otherwise the activity had to be rescheduled to a later date. The ﬁnal plan
listed every type of material, equipment, number and type of personnel, duration of
the job, as well as related activities such as local isolations or scaffolding required for
its execution. This two-week plan was prepared by the onshore planner, sent offshore
for review and if accepted, ﬁnalized and send back to offshore for execution. These
plans were generally sent as documents attached to emails, in which offshore
managers “red-lined” problematic activities. The reviewed document was then sent
per email back to the planner.
The observed teams further conducted regular planning meetings, usually once
a week, in which the six week plan was discussed between managers and
engineers onshore, and managers offshore. In these discussions offshore provided
input on possible constraints, for instance, whether the required technicians were
available for the scheduled shift, as well as suggestions on the clustering of
related tasks. While the planning and scheduling was driven by onshore, onshore
did not “micromanage” offshore jobs:
“Offshore is only responsible for the six week window, but there are
processes to take place for any activity in there that needs to be scheduled.
Now, if they are talking about a piece of work that needs a guy or a couple
of guys offshore that needs to be scheduled, that has implications for POB
[personnel on board], the chopper seats, the materials, or the equipment
when it’s going to be shipped. That has implications, so there have to be
conversations on that. But if we’re talking about a 1 hr job for a tech to go
out and do something, that’s completely on them. I’m not micro-managing
right down to the tech, one-hour jobs. I’m sort of doing the higher level
process and lining up the actual work with a block of time that somebody
should be there.” [onshore planner]
Plans frequently had to be changed on short notice due to unplanned events like
sudden breakdowns of equipment or spells of bad weather that made the execution of
outside work impossible. In an extreme case, bad winter weather prevent helicopters
from landing on a production ship to bring in new staff and take people off; even
boats were not able to land, so that instead of the usual fourteen days, offshore
personnel were forced to stay on-board for over three weeks. In that time, not only
food became sparse, but also electricity and materials. Moreover, tools, materials,
and specialist vendors could not be brought offshore and most planned activities had
to be put on hold until the weather cleared. The complexity of plan changes can be
illustrated with this account of an onshore planner:
“You look at when that activity may have to happen, what’s in there. Does
anything need to move, has anything got to be rescheduled to allow that
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piece of work to happen? Then the discussions start, ‘right, we can do that
job; we need three mechanics to work on the process or the gas turbines.
For this job here, we need mechanics, then we can’t do this job and we need
to reschedule that one to later. So maybe reschedule that a week back’. And
then we got the whole process of telling the, saying to the vendor who was
meant to come out at that point, ‘sorry, that got put back for a week’. They
may not have that guy for that week [...] It’s always continuously moving.
It’s not something that’s hard and fast, ‘thank you very much’, and walk
away. It’s continuous, every day, every day.”
Although planning was such a critical activity, onshore as well as offshore
personnel often questioned the efﬁciency of the process. The main problem for
onshore engineers lay in the lacking knowledge of local constraints:
“You know, we can’t see clashes of steelwork or metal work, pipe work. Plus
they might not have someone in place to do the job. If I think, ‘ah, it’s going
to take eight hours’, then they say, ‘ha, that’s a three day job; two men for
three days, not one guy for one day.’” [onshore engineer]
Other challenges mentioned by offshore engineers and technicians were due to
different priorities of onshore and offshore subgroups:
“At our level it’s very, very difﬁcult to try and communicate with them
[onshore] [...] because they’re busy, or what we’re asking for is not in the
priority list; they’ve got other challenging sort of projects going on.”
[offshore technician]
— and sometimes even wounded sensibilities:
“How are you, this young one, who’s been online for three months, telling
me how to change this part when I’ve done it twenty times?” [offshore
engineer]
Using input from offshore to keep plans up-to-date with recent developments
or prevent possible conﬂicts between tasks and resources required a considerable
degree of interaction and information exchanges between subgroups. Traditional
media like phone, email, reports, or audio-conferencing often were not able to
provide sufﬁcient support, mostly because information lacked the necessary
detail (e. g., audio-conferencing) or timeliness (e. g., reports, email). The
implementation of new media allowed a more inclusive approach to planning.
Observations of teams showed that onshore engineers used the video-link to
request input from CRTs and offshore managers on a spontaneous basis to clarify
details in a plan.
VC was also used in the planning meetings together with a desktop-sharing
tool. In these meetings, onshore and offshore subgroups viewed, discussed,
and revised plans directly during the planning meetings. In this way, checks
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and ﬁne-tuning were achieved in one session instead of a series of mails or
calls, which tied down fewer resources for a shorter period of time. Moreover,
since the VC-connections were located in the control room, planning meetings
now also included technicians and control room operators. Before, such
meetings had been restricted to management levels. For offshore personnel
this was a clear beneﬁt, because their point of view was integrated into the
plans early on:
“Because from the onshore point of view, if you think of it, they take more
the project, long-term point of view and that sort of stuff, ‘so what do we
need to do to ﬁt into that?’ But as from the offshore point of view, we take
more day-to-day, what we need to do today to get it going. And then the
CRTs, the operator point of view, they think about how practical it is to
execute those plans. So it’s nice when we have everybody’s input.” [offshore
engineer]
Overall, our observations indicated that offshore personnel became more
closely involved in the planning process, bridging the strict divide of planning
and execution roles. This shift generally led to a higher accuracy of plans and less
re-planning.
3.3.2. Monitoring
Oil production is a continuous process with potential risks for personnel,
equipment, and environment. The main activity for control room technicians
(CRTs) offshore was therefore the monitoring of processes on the plant. CRTs
were located in the control room as the ‘heart and brain’ of the platform, from
where they controlled the electronic and mechanical systems such as valves,
pumps, ﬂow rates, ﬁre alarm systems, or ﬂuid pressures and temperatures. Their
main tasks were to monitor and control the status of the plant, to react to any
changes or system alarms, and to implement production strategies agreed between
onshore and offshore. CRTs were ultimately responsible for the ﬁrst response to
problems, which required an in-depth understanding of the system and quick
decisions. Monitoring was the sole responsibility of CRTs; other offshore
personnel or onshore engineers were not involved in the immediate monitoring
process.
Due to this strict role separation, onshore engineers in the traditional setting
had no direct access to real-time process data. If requested, offshore staff sent
snapshots of real-time data as spreadsheets:
“Real real-time data they can [get], but that’s our decision. But what we do,
we print off a graph or we do a data dump and send it to them, so they can
look at it.” [offshore installation manager]
Data-bases with some parameters had been available, but were seldom used
because onshore engineers perceived the access as cumbersome and of little
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relevance for most jobs. With the installation of the large data screens in the
onshore team areas real-time data became easier available, and onshore engineers
used these screens to monitor developments of their platform. The main beneﬁt of
the screens for onshore engineers was a better understanding of the present
production and plant status:
“You can see what the state of the plant is; and the moment in time you see
it go down, you think ‘oh, what’s happening?’ [...] So in terms of being
aware of how the plant is running and the impact, I think, it’s great.”
This better awareness of the plant status in the onshore ofﬁce also reduced the
need to contact offshore staff for updates or detailed information, and thus
eliminated distractions and reduced the workload for CRTs.
With the data screens, onshore engineers slipped into a kind of secondary
monitoring role scanning the information for unusual patterns and signs for
potential problems. Still, monitoring onshore and offshore retained very different
functions and criticality. While CRTs required second-by-second data to control
the live system, onshore engineers focused on trends and longer-term develop-
ments to forestall negative developments (e. g., equipment breakdowns) or to
chart possible improvements to the plant. Offshore monitoring can thus be seen as
part of a ‘fast feedback loop’ (seconds to minutes) to catch immediate events,
while onshore represented an outer, slower feedback loop (hours to days). The
delay between the two feedback loops was part of the different roles of onshore
and offshore staff in the operation process. The availability and quality of data
onshore, however, impacted the possible speed of reactions by onshore to actual
or potential problems offshore. The immediate accessibility of offshore data
effectively drew onshore closer into the fast feedback loop:
“We already had a portion of real time data that was coming into the ofﬁce.
We probably weren’t using it. The difference with having the [new ICT] was
the data was there in the past, but we didn’t have the screens around us to
project the data up, which would provoke a conversation; now we do. So the
data is now there, we’ll try to have a monitor, which will have the minute by
minute production from the ﬁeld and minute by minute injection rates, and
so having that, took away having to pull any other type of data up. And
having it right in front of you, that allows us to—‘wait!’. It just raises
questions, ‘oh, why did that happen?’, and, ‘well, lets look into it’. It
provokes an investigation rather than not noticing until weeks time, when it
comes up in a summarized report or we’re even missing it.” [onshore
manager]
Onshore engineers and managers were generally positive about the increased
possibility to monitor plant processes from the ofﬁce, because it gave them a
better awareness of the plant and production status and an earlier indication of
potential problems. However, observations suggested a more problematic aspect
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of this secondary monitoring role, namely the blurring of the original division of
onshore and offshore roles. As one onshore manager explained, “the primary
focus is strategic for onshore”. With the availability of real-time data and the
easier access to the control room, onshore engineers were now drawn closer into
the day-to-day issues on the platform with the danger of loosing their longer-
term, strategic focus:
“[Onshore] you’re supporting the frontline for sure, but that’s a longer time
frame. I mean, the guys offshore, the mechies and techies and stuff offshore
don’t need any help changing transmitters. They don’t even want to talk
about it. That’s their job. But I just see it. They [onshore] get sucked—, they
have just been sucked into that.” [onshore manager]
The new ICT thus seemed to be a two-edged sword for onshore staff. While on
the one hand it provided onshore engineers with a better awareness of processes
and the ability to spot potential problems earlier, it also seemed to invite a move
into a more tactical, short-term role. This blurring of roles could leave a gap with
respect to longer-term, more strategic decisions, moving team activities from a
pro-active process driven by onshore strategy to a more reactive stance driven by
demands and requirements offshore. Based on our observations most teams
seemed able to retain the separation between a longer- and short-term focus,
although several onshore engineers voiced concerns that the increased demands
by offshore left insufﬁcient time for the longer-term aspects of their jobs.
Especially, higher than normal workloads or a series of unexpected events could
considerably increase the pressure on onshore staff to drift into a short-term
support role.
3.3.3. Trouble-shooting
The two major types of problems requiring onshore–offshore coordination
were production losses and safety-critical events with the potential to
endanger plant, personnel, or environment. Offshore participants often
described themselves as “the ﬁrst line of defense and the ﬁrst line of attack”.
They not only carried the personal risks in case of major incidents, but direct
intervention and access to ﬁrst-hand information on incidents were only
possible on the rig itself. The majority of problems were handled directly by
offshore staff and then reported at the next regular team meeting. As these
comments suggest, both subgroups accepted this as an efﬁcient way to deal
with minor problems:
“One of the machines shut down, one of the compressors. It was a water
cooling system for the lubricating oil and the lubricating oil went too hot, so
it shut down and they found out it was a pressure control valve that had
failed. And they [offshore] then made the decision by themselves to take the
one from a machine that was down and they would scavenge it and just put
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it in. They didn’t have to wait and say, ‘it’s gone down, can you get a spare
for us?’ They took that by themselves, and therefore they came back faster
then they would otherwise have done.” [onshore engineer]
“We are pretty self-sufﬁcient in quite a lot of things. If we have a problem
here, then we try to solve it ourselves ﬁrst, do what we need to do out here.
[...] [Our technicians] can telephone various vendors, if we need any spare
parts. They can purchase material. They can order those sort of stuff
themselves. [...] If we have a problem, we can’t solve here, we tend to give
the engineers a telephone call.” [offshore manager]
As this last comment indicates, onshore involvement became necessary when
offshore staff was not able to diagnose the problem or when solutions had to be
checked for compliance with technical standards or industry procedures.
The main problem for effective cooperation in trouble-shooting was for onshore
staff to obtain timely information that a problem had occurred. With traditional
media like phone or email, onshore personnel had to trust their offshore colleagues to
contact them, as this was the only way to know an unexpected event had happened.
The lacking transparency at times led to a clash of expectations between the self-
proclaimed “self-sufﬁciency” of offshore and the desire of onshore engineers to be
informed of events or involved in problem solutions:
“You go in on a Wednesday morning and you ﬁnd out that something
happened on Tuesday morning and they never told you. They say, ‘well, we
rang and you weren’t there. We tried to call such and such’. And you don’t
really know if they have or not or if they just kind of said, ‘oh, we’ll just
make a decision ourselves’. [onshore engineer]
Another problem was to obtain accurate and detailed information on the event
to create a common understanding of the problem, as well as a shared
understanding of possible solutions. In the traditional setting, offshore staff
frequently attached photos, drawings, or test results to emails, which were then
discussed by phone or audio-conferencing:
“I could get a phone call right now where there is a problem with a valve, for
example. Now, the guy over the phone, he’s seeing the speciﬁc problem right in
front of him, so he knows roughly what it is or what it might be. So he then picks
up the phone—. There are three choices. He drops an email, trying to describe
the problem or he can pick up the phone and try to explain the problem. More
often than not, from his initial phone call, I will have two, three, four more
phone call between us. And maybe I have speciﬁc questions, is it this or really
this. To the point where, email is more advanced these days, so the guy can take
a drawing and scan it or make comments on the drawing and send it. And then
again, that will involve more phone calls to discuss this drawing. And that is in
general how it works.” [onshore engineer]
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Although solutions for complex problems were driven by onshore, both sides
agreed that engineering knowledge and on-site knowledge had to be integrated to
ﬁnd the best possible solution:
“Offshore tend to have knowledge and understanding, but in a different way. So
they know if they turn valve A, B happens, but they don’t always know why.
Whereas onshore, you tend to know what should happen and what might
happen; if you do A then B will happen, but also C, D and E. And what you
need to do is get both parties talking to each other and understanding that one
group doesn’t have all the knowledge. You actually need to marry both of them
together to make the right decision” [onshore manager]
Our observations indicated that this process when based on phone, email, and
audio-conferencing could lead to drawn out discussions and was fraught with
misunderstandings, which can be problematic especially in time- and safety-critical
situations. The new ICTsupported trouble-shooting in two ways. The data-screens in
the team areas onshore showed dips in production or unusual patterns in equipment
parameters. Instead of having to wait for a phone call or email from offshore, onshore
engineers could thus register unusual events as they happened. While not of
immediate use for the analysis of the problem, the data screens alerted onshore faster
of potential problems and in this way reduced the likelihood of problems going
unnoticed. The introduction of video-conferencing further improved the speed and
accuracy of problem-solving by supporting visual information like hand gestures or
presentation of objects, as well as increasing the access to onshore expertise:
“You try to explain locations of things [...] ‘It comes down from the deck
like that and it comes across like this and it’s supported under there like
that.’ [moves hands to demonstrate]. You can do that kind of thing and it
makes it a lot easier.” [offshore manager]
“The guys in the control room can walk around and see the folk sat there
and say, ‘We just had an alarm on such and such and what should we do?’
And they’re able to deal with it instantly. So they’ve suddenly got a room
full of experts, they can call in for help.” [onshore engineer]
The beneﬁt this new technology could have for the speed of trouble-shooting
can be demonstrated by the following example:
“The classic example [...] was when the guys offshore used to do some oil
sampling of the main generation turbines, and the sample when it is
supposed to be a nice light, like a lager color, it came out like Guinness
black. So they immediately ran down the stairs, pointed it up the screen and
said, ‘look, that’s the sample’; and we said, ‘shut the turbine down’. Now
and that was a decision made there and then. It wasn’t a case of, ‘you know,
oh, is it that bad? Send it in for analysis. When the analysis is done we’re
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going to worry about it’. So where it could have been three or four days
delay, could have been a train wreck in the equipment [...] it was right up at
the screen, ‘this is how it should look like, this is what it does look like’ –
‘Ah, we got a problem. Shut it down’.” [onshore engineer]
Despite such clear advantages, offshore technicians and managers felt that the
greater visibility of problems and the presence of onshore engineers through
video-links also had its negative aspects, primarily an increased pressure for
CRTs:
“The last thing [the CRTs] want is somebody standing over their shoulder. And
basically that screen at that period would be somebody looking over their
shoulder or wondering what’s going on; or they [onshore] would [...] say,
‘there’s been a trip on [the platform]’. Somebody would phone me.” [offshore
installation manager]
Similar to monitoring, the added visibility and copresence between subgroups
had thus positive, as well as negative aspects. On the one hand, increased
visibility of problems improved the efﬁciency of coordination in trouble-shooting
activities. On the other hand, the lacking visibility had provided an effective safe-
guard against ‘meddling’ or ‘over-involvement’ by onshore. Usually, smaller
problems were handled directly by offshore staff often without onshore staff
knowing that a problem had occurred. Due to the implementation of real-time
data screens and continuous video-links, onshore engineers now were also aware
of smaller problems. The new ICT thus changed the traditional escalation strategy
from offshore to onshore, with the consequence that onshore engineers were more
often drawn into resolving minor issues and took part in reactive ﬁre-ﬁghting.
Again, similar to monitoring, the new media encouraged a blurring of the
traditional onshore and offshore roles.
3.3.4. Informing/reporting
The geographical distance and low visibility of processes made the task of
informing and reporting probably the most important activity for subgroup
coordination in production teams. Without proper information on the present
production, type and dates of planned shipments, weather developments,
equipment failures, upcoming maintenance work, or available personnel on
board, coordination would operate in the void.
The main topics on which onshore staff needed information and reports from
offshore were updates on production numbers, tasks executed in the last 24 hrs
and planned tasks for the coming day, information on health and safety, weather,
logistics, as well as sudden changes in the operation of the plant, breakdowns of
equipment, and changes in the plan due to unexpected events. Information from
onshore to offshore was needed on topics like production forecasts, planning
decisions, or changes in agreed plans.
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Traditionally the most important activity for the exchange of information
and updates on developments offshore over the last 24 hrs were morning
meetings. Before the implementation of VC these meetings were conducted
over audio-conferencing between onshore engineers and management on the
one side and offshore management on the other. The frequency of these
morning meetings varied across teams from every day (Monday to Friday) to
three times a week. In these meetings also plans for the day and possible
challenges to existing plans were discussed. In the traditional setting, these
morning reports were often the only regular contacts between onshore and
offshore staff. Over the week additional meetings took place for speciﬁc topics
like maintenance planning, production planning, logistics, or health and safety,
or environmental issues.
Outside of meetings, information requests by either onshore or offshore staff
were sent by email or discussed over phone. The difﬁculty of relaying
information in a fast and efﬁcient way between onshore and offshore using
traditional media may be judged by this report of an onshore engineer:
“It can be as bad as having to walk several hundred yards to a noisy
telephone booth, ring onshore, they get the support engineer’s voice mail
because he is away in a meeting. He then leaves a message, goes back to
the work site, the engineer comes back, calls the platform, can’t get the
person; they put a pager out for him. Now, the guy on-site probably won’t
hear that pager, because it is noisy and if he does hear the pager, he has to
go and ﬁnd a phone to call back. At this point, [the onshore support
engineer] has gone to another meeting. It is like ships passing in the night.”
The difﬁculty of getting hold of onshore engineers was the most frequent
complaint by offshore managers and technicians. The continuous video-links
improved this situation dramatically, as now offshore personnel could easily
oversee the team area to check whether a person was available. Video-
conferencing also allowed more direct conversations between subgroups, which
both sides perceived as a welcome time saver:
“It’s stopped a lot of the three-way communication. So it’s stopped [the
onshore engineer] calling me, me going to the CRT, the CRT telling me they
can’t do it and then me going back to [the onshore engineer], ‘they say they
can’t do it’. So now we have the meetings, where we have basically all three
of us to make the decisions, and everybody puts in.” [offshore engineer]
Since the continuous video-links allowed easier interactions during the rest of
the day, many of the formal meetings not only became shorter and more focused,
some teams also reduced the total amount of meetings, as onshore staff tended to
be informed of activities and developments on an ongoing basis. Because the VC-
facilities were located in the control room, technicians and CRTs were now
included more frequently in discussions, which increased the spread and ﬂow of
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information between subgroups. At the same time, onshore managers saw less
need to be present in meeting between subgroups:
“As a team leader you would be tied up in meeting after meeting after meeting,
and a lot of it was repetitive to be honest. So now that the meetings are running
well, team leaders tend not to go to a lot of the meetings. [...] And it’s not
because of lack of interest. It’s there’s no need. [...] It’s freed up a bit more time
for team leaders to do some thinking time.” [onshore manager]
The new media capabilities added visibility and cotemporality for personal
communications, as well as data. Over time this achieved a better awareness
between members of onshore and offshore on multiple levels: in the short-term on
present activities and work load; in the mid and longterm a better understanding
and appreciation of roles, responsibilities, and systems. Most problematic in the
traditional setting was in the eyes of onshore engineers the lacking awareness of
production and plant status and the low transparency of processes offshore (“The
only way we could ﬁnd out if a piece of plant was online was to call the control
room on the phone and ask them”). Onshore engineers therefore greeted the
implementation of the data screens as a way to increase their general awareness of
the plant status. As discussed above, onshore engineers generally did not use the
screens for in-depth insights into the running of the plant, but to obtain quick
updates on the plant and process status. The availability of real-time data further
reduced the need to call the control room offshore for routine information, which
reduced the amount of disruptions for CRTs throughout the day.
Overall, the implementation of new ICT seemed to have made reporting and
informing between subgroups easier and more efﬁcient; the main beneﬁts being
the better access to expertise in either subgroup, less time wasted in trying to get
hold of people, and more focused, shorter interactions. Generally, informing and
reporting became less sporadic and less formal. Instead of formally scheduled
meetings, contacts between subgroups were spread throughout the day instigated
more by immediate needs for information:
“Nine times out of ten the guys would phone you ﬁrst thing in the morning, and
you would have a chat what they would do offshore, what support they were
needing, etc. And that would be it; you would only speak to one mechy or
maybe two mechies, depending who’s on shift. Now, they’ll come in, they’ll
have a chat with you in the morning, and then lunchtime they would come in
with some of the vendors that may have a question. And rather than them being
the conduit where the vendor has asked them the question, they’ve posed me the
question, I reply to them and them going back to the vendor, the vendor is there
already. And the guys offshore regularly take in the vendors, we’ve got this
problem or we just want a bit of clariﬁcation on certain things. So the guys are
on the VT, oh, I would say, three, four, maybe ﬁve time a day, while before you
might only have that one phone call in the morning.” [onshore engineer]
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3.3.5. Execution
The direct execution in terms of daily oil production and maintenance of the
installation is by necessity an offshore task, and in general offshore personnel
tended to prefer as little involvement by onshore personnel as possible:
“We’re always working towards a plan. We know on a day-to-day basis
what work is coming up and you mainly only get personally involved with
the beach if something goes wrong.” [offshore technician]
Execution of tasks encompassed maintenance work by technicians, monitoring
and controlling of the platform, as well as changes to the well conﬁguration by
CRTs to optimize or restore production. Execution was considered a pure offshore
task. For this reason, traditionally the onshore subgroup had only very restricted
access to real-time information from offshore.
As already discussed in other activities, the implementation of the additional
ICT capabilities increased awareness of plant status and improved access to
offshore personnel. This meant that onshore engineers and managers were better
informed about activities at the remote site and over time obtained a better
understanding of equipment and well behaviors. Due to the direct video-link into
the control room production engineers were more frequently and directly
involved in the ﬁne-tuning of equipment for the optimization of production.
Where before engineers would have sent a document with details on the
requested changes by email, often followed up by phone calls or other emails to
clarify and revise procedures, procedures were now discussed directly with the
control room operator on the board.
Besides this more active role of onshore staff in inﬂuencing well settings,
improved relationships and trust between subgroups also led to a tendency to
relax control:
“I just ﬂag up this job saying ‘needs to be done some time in the next
three months’. Whether it is then today or in two and a half months time doesn’t
matter [...] so they can have the freedom to manage some of the tasks offshore.
We don’t need to have that control as well.” [onshore engineer]
Yet, our observations on execution also highlighted another potentially problem-
atic aspect of the technological change.Work processes offshore were highly scripted
and proceduralized, in that every activity had to be checked and signed-off by
supervisors and entered into a planning system to prevent potentially dangerous
overlaps between tasks. For this reason all requests were usually ﬁrst sent to offshore
managers, who then relayed these requests to the appropriate technicians for
execution. Especially offshore managers feared that the easier access to lower levels
of the organization could lead to a slipping of control on activities offshore:
“The ‘always on’ thing is great. I wouldn’t take anything away from that,
but there needs to be clear boundaries as to what decision can be made.
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[...] My worry is that if you don’t set that boundary up, we could just sit up
here, unless we’ve got a three-way [VC], we could just sit up here, go
downstairs and the whole world has changed.” [offshore manager]
If not managed correctly the increasing involvement of onshore in requesting
and guiding activities at the technician level could thus be a potential danger for
the integrity of the existing control system.
4. Discussion
In this study we tried to gather ﬁrst insights into how changes in ICT inﬂuence every-
daywork processes in ongoing distributed cooperation. For this purpose, we analyzed
cooperation processes in offshore oil production teams and the impact of changing
media capabilities on subgroup cooperation. The tasks of onshore and offshore
subgroups in production teams were found to be closely interlinked and consequently
both groups had to rely on tight coordination to accomplish their common goal, i. e.,
maximum oil and gas production under safe conditions. Although type and degree of
interdependencies varied across the main activities, the performance of one subgroup
depended very much on the performance of the other, indicating high task
interdependency (Thompson 1967; Van der Vegt and Janssen 2003). Due to the
inherent geographical separation this interdependence had to be managed with sole
reliance on communication and information technologies to support coordination, as
well as to mitigate the dynamic nature and potential risks of the team task.
Under normal conditions, i. e., undisturbed plant operations, the respective roles
and division of labor between onshore and offshore were well established and did not
require much negotiation. Differences in terms of primary tasks, work schedules, or
access to plant and information were well known and integrated into the normal work
process due to a long common history of remote cooperation. Yet, the existing
processes and routines had been developed based on traditional media capabilities
(phone, email, mail, audio-conferencing, planning systems), which provided little
opportunity for direct continuous interaction between subgroups.
As we have seen in our ﬁndings for individual team activities, the new ICT
capabilities shifted the clear boundaries between established responsibilities, such
as a higher degree of offshore involvement in planning or a changing role of
onshore in monitoring and trouble-shooting. Although the main responsibilities
did not change, over time the division of ‘planning’ and ‘doing’ between
subgroups became less strict. Traditionally, subgroups tended to act as
“segregated territories” (Clement and Wagner 1995) in which the combination
of homogeneity in local groups and heterogeneity of distanced groups hampered
the establishment of common interpretations of information and situations. The
implementation of VC and better access to data increased the ability to establish
shared interpretations and understanding, which could considerably increase the
speed of reactions in sporadic activities like trouble-shooting. Overall, the better
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awareness decreased the need for direct contact for routine information, while the
VC-links facilitated contacts for non-routine information. Observing teams over
twelve months, these media further seemed to help in removing negative effects
of remoteness also in less tangible areas, e. g., by increasing the mutual
understanding of each others’ roles and capabilities and a better acceptance of
potential conﬂicts over priorities.
The new tools also helped to increase social interactions, as well as better awareness
on “who is around” (social awareness), “what is happening” (action awareness), and
“how are things going” (activity awareness) (Carroll et al. 2003). With traditional
media, this type of information was nearly impossible to obtain, leading to a state of
team opacity related to coordination problems and failures (Fiore et al. 2003). As work
in the aviation industry and offshore oil drilling demonstrates, situational awareness
and understanding of situations play an important role in the avoidance of accidents
(Jones and Endsley 1996; Sneddon et al. 2006). As Heyer (2009) observed in his
ethnographic study in an oil and gas reﬁnery, engineers were conscious about their
lower level of awareness about details on the plant compared to ﬁeld operators with
continuous access. In their opinion, video-links or reports could not replace getting a
ﬁrst hand ‘personal impression’ of problems. Our onshore engineers felt the same
way, but the geographical distance between onshore offshore and rig, as well as
the logistical hassles involved in sending people offshore makes physical access
to the plant much more difﬁcult than for land-based reﬁneries. Onshore engineers
still went offshore in case of more severe problems, but compared to the
traditional setting the additional ICT made these visits less frequent. Also, while
visits to the rig may provide onshore engineers with a ‘snap-shot’ of processes
offshore, the new ICT actually helped both subgroups to develop a more realistic
picture of work processes at the ‘other end’ in the long-term.
The impact of the new ICT did not lead to a radical change in team coordination,
but rather to the modiﬁcation and adaptation of existing routines. We can therefore
speak of a transformation of capabilities characterized by the “integration of new
routines with carryover of existing routines” (Lavie 2006, p. 160). The additional ICT
did not so much replace, but offer alternatives to existing media for better interaction
and task support. These developments were frequently experienced as a positive
change from the former situation, as it made interactions smoother and more efﬁcient.
Over time, decision making processes involvedmore lower levels of the organization
and reduced the transfer of information via managers, which increased efﬁciency of
processes and decreased the involvement of managers in day-to-day tasks. However,
as highlighted in the sections on execution, monitoring, and trouble-shooting, this
development can also be problematic. Shifting the existing boundaries between
planning and execution, and moving decision from managers to the ‘shop ﬂoor’
could lead to a situation in which the oversight of activities or developments becomes
lost. For this reason Johnsen et al. (2007) actually argue that “increased connectivity
and human collaboration in remote operations have signiﬁcantly enhanced the risks
to safety and security” in oil and gas production operations (p. 83).
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Overall, we identiﬁed three main challenges due to the changes in ICT
capabilities in our sample: a) the blurring of the traditional subgroup roles of
‘planning’ versus ‘execution’, b) the loss of the longer-term, strategic focus for
the team, as onshore became more involved in day-to-day activities offshore, and
c) the loss of oversight for managers. These problems were perceived by onshore
as well as offshore personnel, but we are not aware of any direct interventions to
manage the potential risks involved in these shifts. Generally, risks were
mitigated by strict rules and guidelines, i. e., a high ‘scriptedness’ of processes,
speciﬁcally in the planning and execution of work, but it is not clear whether the
existence of these guidelines and procedures will be sufﬁcient to attenuate all
potential negative effects. The existing rules and procedures, which had been
developed based on the traditional capabilities for cooperation, were called into
question by the newer media capabilities. For instance, the traditionally strongly
hierarchical communication—from onshore engineers to onshore management to
offshore management to offshore technicians—was rendered obsolete by the
implementation of continuous video-links between onshore engineers and offshore
technicians. While the organization overtly promoted this development, the
consequences of these changes were not directly addressed.
The company-wide ICT implementation aimed at a ‘re-alignment’ of onshore and
offshore subgroups. Yet, it seems that the long-term consequences of closer onshore–
offshore coordination were not fully understood, and even less anticipated. The
implementation of ICT had been announced as a means to improve support for
offshore processes. Initial reactions by the majority of offshore personnel made clear,
however, that this group perceived the initiative as a way to increase onshore control.
The implementation thus infringed on implicit or explicit agreements with respect to
onshore and offshore responsibilities and roles. As some offshore personnel pointed
out, increased contact from onshore defeated the purpose of working offshore as a
conscious decision to become ‘unreachable’ and independent. The psychological
contract for these individuals had suddenly changed, which in some cases resulted in
confusion and resentment. The initial rejection of the VC-links (e. g., putting hard
hats or coffee cups over cameras, or pointing them to the ceiling and corners) can be
understood in these terms. After some months the majority of onshore and offshore
personnel seemed to have accepted the change towards the new technologies, and
onshore and offshore subgroups developed usage routines for the new capabilities.
The comparatively smooth transition may be due to the incremental nature of the
changes, as well as the feeling that these technologies were unavoidable and part of
“the future”. Positive experiences such as faster problem identiﬁcation or easier
solution to operational problems further helped to increase acceptance.
4.1. Considerations on technology design
A major challenge in supporting distributed teams in the oil and gas production
lies in the disparate requirements in terms of information and data between the
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two subgroups. Responsibilities for the nine primary tasks were not uniform, and
accordingly the type of information needed by onshore and offshore staff varied
considerably. At the same time the high task interdependency required continuous
awareness of states and activities. During normal operations both subgroups
based their work on the same general information, but the required depth of
information as well as the time spans considered by offshore and onshore
subgroups differed notably. In our sample, only CRTs required second by second
updates on data during normal operations, whereas onshore engineers took a
longer-term view of hours and days. This changed, when unexpected events
occurred that could potentially compromise production or even endanger plant,
personnel, or environment. Depending on the present situation or main activity,
the required degree of interdependence and extent of coordination between
subgroups could change substantially, and given the time- and safety-critical
nature of the task these changes might occur very quickly and any time. In such
events, teams move from a status with little need for overlap to a status, in which
both subgroups need immediate and complete access to the same in-depth
information.
The role of ICT in this change from normal to abnormal situations was
demonstrated in an experimental study on process control operators by Nickel
and Nachreiner (2008). Comparing performance of operators in normal and
abnormal control situation using one or two visual units for the functional
dynamic display of information, they found that time for fault management
deteriorated in abnormal conditions if only one display was available. Thus,
information that had been sufﬁcient during normal operations turned out to be
inadequate in critical conditions. In distributed ongoing coordination in
production teams the situation is even more problematic, as here technology
has to accommodate changing information requirements of subgroups with very
different but highly inter-related tasks and perspectives. For the support of
distributed ongoing teams such as oil production teams data presentation should
thus be scalable with respect to type of information, amount, degree of detail, or
time frames.
Our study also highlighted a conﬂict between media choices based on the
normal role of organizational members and requirements in critical, but sporadic
situations. Available data for onshore and offshore subgroups in the traditional
setting, for instance, varied in detail (i. e., sampling rates), which could lead to
different decisions for the same problem. In oil production teams onshore
technical authorities generally made the decision, on whether a procedure is
technically sound. While the onshore subgroups thus had the decision authority in
terms of technical and legal standards, in some cases they lacked the adequate
information to make such decisions in an informed way. Traditional ICT in our
sample had been based on the primary role understanding of ‘onshore planning’
and ‘offshore execution’. This example again demonstrates the need for ﬂexibility
and access for detailed data also for functions that do not usually require
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continuous detailed updates. It further highlights the challenge in distributed team
coordination of balancing location of the richest information and locations at
which decisions are made.
To remove the lacking transparency of processes we further argue that media
should support social, action, and activity awareness, as well as the development
of system knowledge between subgroups, e. g., by enabling more direct, real-time
interactions. For more efﬁcient sharing of information and perspectives media
should also allow simultaneous operations and decisions by subgroups, for
instance, by offering collective viewing and manipulation of data or visual
information such as pictures or graphs and good quality video-conferencing to
allow body language and physical pointers.
Technology should further be able to accommodate different and changing
requirements for accessibility and privacy in the two subgroups or of one
subgroup over time. As comments by offshore personnel showed, in times of high
workload at the sharp end, continuous video-links can be a hindrance for
concentrated work and thus add undue pressure. For this reason teams in our
sample generally developed a protocol that on such occasions CRTs were
encouraged to shut cameras off. Also decisions on where cameras are placed, the
degree of resolution, or the remote controlling of camera angles are important
aspects for regulating the amount of distraction, personal comfort in media
environments, and the acceptance of new media (e. g., is it really necessary to see
“every wart” on the nose of your communication partner; or should offshore
technicians indeed be able to read emails on the PC screens of their colleagues
onshore).
Another problem for the coordination between remote subgroups is the
documentation of decisions. In oil production teams, for instance, onshore
engineers are not as easily available during nights and weekends, although
production still continues on the remote site. Decisions made during these times
and their rationales must be comprehensible and reviewable by the other
subgroup. Regular turnover in membership—in our case rotating shifts
offshore—similarly challenges the continuity of processes. Decisions and
procedures discussed with one shift were often not handed over fully to the
next, and then had to be re-negotiated or explained again. While the verbal
agreements, emails, or slide attachments used in our sample can be effective
for teams with stable membership, these media were inadequate given the
rotating shift system in oil production teams. To maintain efﬁcient coordina-
tion, teams must thus be able to capture events and decisions taken by one
subgroup in the absence of the other in sufﬁcient detail for review or for other
team members to take over without delay.
A recurring conﬂict for nearly all critical team activities was the tension
between better coordination due to improved access to the remote subgroup, and
possible distractions from the main job function (i. e., monitoring and controlling
for CRTs, longer-term strategic work for onshore engineers), as well as the
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potential blurring of subgroups roles. Affordances of the new media clearly
supported closer coordination and higher involvement between subgroups, and
in many ways the new media provided considerable beneﬁts for the
coordination of tasks and processes. The potentially more problematic side
effects did not become apparent until months after the implementation. At this
point, technological changes in distributed team coordination clearly require a
re-consideration of subgroup roles and responsibilities and the negotiation of
usage rules—or a renewed discussion around the desirable features of media.
5. Conclusion
Olson and Olson (2000) discussed four concepts for successful distributed
working: common ground, coupling of work, collaboration readiness, and
collaboration technology readiness. They argued that remote working should
succeed best if teams were loosely coupled, i. e., have fewer dependencies and
rely mostly on routines, whereas high interdependency tasks should ideally be co-
located. For tasks such as offshore oil production co-location clearly is not an
option and accordingly, choosing ICT that can support highly-interdependent
tasks in distributed settings is crucial. In our study we investigated the effects of
different media capabilities on coordination in highly interlinked distributed
production teams in the offshore oil industry. We further identiﬁed a number of
challenges for the team functioning, when moving from one set of technologies to
another. The technological change observed in this study altered existing routines,
indicating that the organization of distributed working is very much a question of
the available media capabilities. Our ﬁndings also showed that technology
changes can modify the coupling within teams by shifting established roles of
actors.
The present study used a longitudinal multi-layered approach in following
teams for twelve months, observing their work in various situations, and
collecting further insights through semi-structured interviews. For security and
privacy reasons, we were not able to obtain systematic data on technology use
(server statistics, email content, etc.), so our information relies mostly on
subjective measures and incidental events during periods of observations.
Although we feel that the length and approach of the present study provided us
with a good basis for investigating the intricacies involved in remotely operating
teams with highly interdependent tasks, further studies including more objective
data on media type and usage could clearly broaden our understanding of effects
of media capabilities on ongoing cooperation in distributed teams. Considering
the impact of different media conﬁgurations and effects of changes in technology
use over time in other industries that use distributed teams, could provide
additional insights into the speciﬁc needs and challenges of supporting ongoing
remote team cooperation.
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